RB-57D任務的空窗期

9 thoughts on “RB-57D任務的空窗期”

1. With regards to your question about why there was no overflight between late June and October of 1959, I asked myself the same question too when I read through Colonel Lu’s book. I talked to Colonel Lu about this but he could not recall any request from the US during this period of time and he does not know the reason. RB-57D strategic overflights were all requested by the US and not based on RoCAF’s need. It is not likely that the gap was due to weather problem because there were many targets to wet the USAF target planners’ appetite and there was no reason to let the RB-57Ds sit in the airfield for 3 long months just because of persistent overcast over certain areas of the mainland China of interest. Colonel Lu was not aware of any mechanical problem with “both” RB-57Ds during that period of time that could have grounded them.

    

   About 2 years ago, I accidentally stumbled onto the possible answer to this question from a book titled, Foreign Relations with the US, 1958-1960, Volume XIX. This book is published by US Government documenting the history of the US’s foreign relations with various countries. This book documents a telegram from the US Embassy in the Republic of China [Taiwan] to the US Department of State, dated July 23, 1959, which states, in part, following:

    

   “During past few weeks Admiral Smoot, General Dean and I [US Ambassador Drumright] have discussed growing restiveness on part of President [of Republic of China], Foreign Minister, and high military authorities over checks imposed by US on [RoCAF’s] aerial reconnaissance. As I reported on several recent telegrams, Khrushchev’s alleged remarks to Harriman appear to have given impetus to desire to resume CAF [Chinese Air Force] reconnaissance . Problem approached climax yesterday [July 22, 1959] when [Defense] Minister Yu [of the Republic of China] informed Admiral Smoot it may be necessary any time for CAF to initiate aerial reconnaissance “covered by fighter escort, with or without US concurrence”. Yu also told Admiral [Smoot] [that] US has moral obligation to permit GRC[Government of Republic of China] to procure information re [regarding] report rocket sites on mainland or get such information for GRC. Problem reached climax this morning when CAF acting A-3 informed General Dean [that] MND[Ministry of National Defense] had just directed CAF to photograph gun positions on mainland coast opposite Kinmen and airfields in immediate vicinity.”

    

   It appears that after the Battle of 823 in late 1958, US had imposed strict rule on the GRC to conduct tactical aerial reconnaissance over mainland China. Because of the improvement of Mainland China’s air defense, the RF-84Fs, operated by CAF, could not conduct tactical reconnaissance alone anymore. As a result, most if not all tactical reconnaissance flights that were conducted in 1957 and 58 were with fighter escort. US considered that was too provocative and might be misunderstood by mainland China as a prelude to an all out attack. As a result, after the battle of 823, US imposed limitation on these tactical recon. flights conducted by CAF either by limitation the number of recon flight over high risk areas or the number of escorted fighters involved. This might be the reason why you do not hear much about any air battle over the Strait of Formosa in the early 1959. In mid 1959, Taiwan was getting nervous about the military built up across the Strait and was eager to resume the tactical reconnaissance flight with fighter escort and informed US of its intention with or without US concurrence.

    

   Also from the same book, a response telegram from the State Department, dated July 24, 1959, told Mr. Drumright to “maintain a strong line against any escorted flights”. The book also references a letter dated August 10, 1959 from Martin [of the State Department] to Drumright stating that a Department of Defense message had been sent to [Admiral] Smoot “providing that a number of high performance RF-101 reconnaissance planes should be turned over to the Nationalists for reconnaissance flights over [mainland china] coastal areas. The flight should be unescorted, undertaken only for strictly intelligent purposes, and only to the extent dictated by military necessity”.

    

   From these telegram correspondences, it appears that US understood the plight of Taiwan for not having the right tactical reconnaissance airplane to conduct recon. flights across the Strait, but for political reason, still would like to maintain the position against any escorted recon flight using the RF-84F. In the end, US Department of Defense decided to transfer the more capable RF-101 to Taiwan to conduct the tactical recon. mission. Because of its improved performance, US believed that fighter escort for the RF-101 mission would not be necessary and this would reduce the chances of instigating another all out aerial battle over the Strait of Formosa. The last thing US wanted would be another battle front in Asia.

    

   So far, everything I have mentioned about is on the tactical reconnaissance flight over mainland China and have nothing to do with the strategic overflight conducted by the RB-57D. As mentioned earlier, the RB-57D overflights were more for the benefit of the USAF target planners than for Taiwan. Essentially all the RB-57D overflights were requested by the US. Therefore, when the escorted tactical recon flight issue was brought to the open in July, I believe that US decided also to stop the RB-57D overflight request so as not to make it look like that US only cared about its strategic overflight interest and ignored the need of CAF. In late October and early November of 1959, the RF-101As were ready to be transferred to Taiwan and the CAF pilots were also trained to fly this new type of recon aircraft. Taiwan was happy and the request for RB-57D overflight was resumed. (Unfortunately, it did not last long. On the third mission after the overflight was resumed, RB-57D “5643” was shot down near Peking on October 7, 1959.)

    

   It is unfortunate that I have to put bits and pieces of telltale information together to come up with the answer to your question instead of referring you to an USAF memo that explicitly documented the reason why no overflight request was made during that 3 month period in 1959. I have not come across this document yet. This document may or may not exist. History shows that if actions were taken, there were usually memos documenting the reasons behind them. If no action was taken, a lot of time, no one would care to put down the reason why. This might be the case. However, I will keep on looking for this elusive USAF memo.

    

   The following is from part of the summary of the Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960, Volume XIX, China. The highlighted parts provide some additional clues confirming that US did not like the provocative tactical recon flights (with fighter escort) conducted by CAF and US did feel that Taiwan was forced to agree with the Joint Communique which imposed a lot of restrictions on Taiwan. The overfight mentioned in the summary is referring to the tactical recon. flights conducted with fighter escort and not the strategic RB-57D overflight.

    

   Conclusion of the [Taiwan Strait] Crisis [of 1958]
   During his October 21-23 [of 1958] visit to Taipei, Dulles [US Secretary of States] told Chiang bluntly that the greatest danger to his government was not military but political and stemmed from the sense of the international community that the intermittent conflict between the Communists and the Nationalists threatened the peace. He urged Chiang to make it clear that his government would not attempt to use force to return to the mainland, to avoid commando raids and overflights, to demonstrate that it would not use the offshore islands for prosecution of the civil war, and to reduce the garrison on Quemoy. Dulles did not try to obtain an immediate announcement of troop reductions, but military discussions on this subject were already underway.

    

   The Joint Communique issued at the conclusion of Dulles’ visit included a key paragraph declaring that the Nationalists would rely primarily on Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles rather than the use of force to achieve their mission of restoring freedom to the mainland. Concerning the offshore islands, it noted that the Communists had renewed their shelling of Quemoy on the eve of Dulles’ visit and stated that “under the present conditions,” the defense of the Quemoys was closely related to the defense of Taiwan. The “non-force declaration” had been obtained with considerable difficulty, Dulles told Eisenhower when he returned, but he thought his talks with Chiang about non-use of force and the unsoundness of identifying his cause with islands as exposed as Quemoy and Matsu had had some impact.

    

   Also, my apology for not responding in Chinese. My computer does not have the software to let me do that (or I do not know how).

2. So it wasn’t due to Major Chen Huai-Shen’s action of stealing a check ride on the RB-57???

3. It is not likely to be the case because the number of RB-57D overflights during the period from January to June of 1959 indicated that the US was very anxious to obtain aerial inland intelligence from mainland China. This is supported by a memo from CINCPAC (Command in Chief, Pacific) to Headquarter USAF and Chief of Naval Operations dated July 1958 on the subject of Chinat (Chinese Nationalists) Recon Program. The memo states, in parts, the following:
   “…. CINCPAC is of [the] opinion that deep penetration recon of China Mainland is increasingly important now in view [of] troubled situation in middle east and possibility [of]outbreak [of] communist activity elsewhere in [an] attempt [to] divert US attention. Much time has elapsed since US has received photo recon of inland China beyond Hankow/Hengyang line. Most existing inland coverage [was] taken during 1944-1949 period. Believe US requirement for this vital photo intelligence [is] much greater than Chinat requirement.”
   “ Believe the future success of Chinat recon effort depends on type [of] equip[ment] offered at this time. Chinats understand advantages of speed but apparently are not yet completely convinced of more subtle advantage offered by very high altitude performance in conjunction with relatively low air speeds, due to their experience with the RB-57A. (One of the 2 heart throb RB-57As supplied to CAF was shot down on February 18, 1958) However, the RB-57D (to be supplied to CAF) should correct this impression as well as providing alternate technique for obtaining deep penetration photo coverage.”
   Stealing a check ride in a plane not authorized to fly was a grave infringement. However, stopping the overflight would end up hurting US’s interest more than Chinat (Taiwan). Therefore, I do not believe stealing a check ride by Major Chen was the reason.
   I am only aware that Major Chen took a ride in the abandoned Heartthrob RB-57A in 1958 after the other RB-57A was shot down over Shan Tung Peninsula. I am not aware that he stole another check ride on the RB-57D.

4. Just got Chris Pocock’s “50 Years of the U-2. The complete Illustrated History of the ‘Dragon Lady'”. Page 133 stated that from June to October, the RB-57D overfly of ML China was stopped for couple of reasons. Besides the ROC and US government fighting over the control of overflight of all recon aircraft, consideration of selling U-2 to ROC was another reason.

   As of June, 1959, 6 ROCAF pilots were already been trained by USAF SAC’s 4080th Wing in Texas for U-2. CIA and USAF both wanted ROCAF to have U-2 to replace RB-57B. But CIA wanted it to be their show, and not run by USAF. White House and NSC and State Dept all wanted to hold off on the “sale” of U-2 to Taiwan. The 5 out of 6 ROCAF pilots completed their U-2 training and returned to Taiwan, but had to return to US in 1960 for refresher training on the U-2 again, due to the delay on making the “sale” of U-2 to Taiwan.

   Until the 2 U-2 were “sold” to Taiwan in late 1960s, State Dept was still insisting that ROCAF should have just use other types of recon platforms, like RF-101(already in ROCAF service) and RB-57D(withdrew after shotdown in Oct. 1959).

5. I read many many stuff regarding ROCAF’s RB-57D, but I’ve never seen a picture of her. Can anyone advise where can I have some?

   Also, I learnt from a magazine that part of “5643” is still kept in one of the flight academy in Mainland China. Anyone has more?

6. If you can read Chinese, then you can see pictures of ROCAF RB-57D in the book 《高空間諜》 by Col. 盧錫良. If not, Martin B-57 Canberra by Robert C. Mikesh is the book for you.

7. Under Project ‘LARGE CHARGE’, Taiwan received two RB-57As. Aircraft No.5642 (52-1431 or 21431) was shot down by PRC on 18th February 1958. Can anyone tell me what is the number of the survived RB-57A (5641 ? and what is the serial number 52 – 1433 or 21433 ?). If it is 52- 1433 or 21433, it had been returned to the U.S. and was later rebuilt as an RB-57F-CF (63 – 13302).

   I hope someone can shed light on the above.

8. The RB-57D-1 ‘5643’ shot down on October 7, 1959 has the serial number 53 -3978 or 33978 and the survived RB-57D-1 ‘5644’ has 53-3981 or 33981.

9. One source says that the remaining RB-57A is really 5641 but the US serial number is 52 – 1427 or 21427 (2nd aircraft out of 67 RB-57As built) instead of 52 -1433 or 21433.

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