Source： Via JFK Library
1962年春，由於中國大陸鬧飢荒，中華民國總統蔣介石認為機不可失，積極伺機進行所謂的「反攻」作戰。他的準備動作都被美國中央情報局據實回報到華府，以下中情局發自台北的電報即是一例：
In the spring of 1962, Chiang Kai-Shek was vigorously preparing for the “counter-invasion of the mainland” to take advantage of the famine and unrest in the PRC. Chiang was dead serious about the counter attack, as the following CIA telegram sent from Taipei described.
Source： CIA
不過在發動作戰之前，蔣介石還必須先得到美國老大哥的背書才行。只是蔣介石擺著正常的外交管道不用，反而透過中情局的台北站長克萊恩（Ray S. Cline）博士來跟白宮溝通。中情局長已在1962年3月告知國府，克萊恩即將返美接任新職（中情局的情報副局長）。就在他動身離台的前一天，克萊恩發了下面這封電報給美國總統甘迺迪的國家安全顧問邦迪（McGeorge Bundy），其中明確指出，蔣介石已經把反攻發起日訂在當年的6月，但也同意按美國的意思將其展延。我從小就接受「反攻大陸」的教育，卻從不知反攻的日期，沒想到卻在美國人的電報裡看到這在當時是絕對絕對機密的日期。
Before launching the first strike, Chiang Kai-Shek needed the endorsement from the US Government. However, instead of using the formal diplomatic channel, Chiang preferred to communicating with the White House through a unique middle, Dr. Ray S. Cline, the chief of CIA’s Taipei station. Cline had been named the Deputy Director of Intelligence and was scheduled to depart for Washington on April 20. Before he left for Washington, Cline sent the following cable to McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Advisor to Presidents John F. Kennedy, on April 19. It was revealed that Chiang had previously set June as the D-day for ROC’s counter-attack but consented to postpone it bowing to the pressure from the US.
Source： CIA
克萊恩預定4月20日搭機返美。就在他上飛機之前，克萊恩跟一些美方人員參加了一場國府召開的機密會議，討論反攻大陸作戰的規劃，國府將這個討論的平台稱為四二０委員會（取4月20日之意）。克萊恩會後馬上又發了下面這封電報給邦迪，第2點的最後一句指出，這個委員會正好可以用來了解國府的計畫，也可以藉此對國府施加影響力。第1點也提到，蔣介石同意將反攻發起日延後六個月。
On the morning of his last day as the Taipei station chief, Cline participated in a secret meeting with ROC military and intelligence officers to discuss Chiang’s counter-attack plan. A committee, consisting of ROC and US officials, was formed and was conveniently referred to as the 420 Committee (for April 20). Before he boarded to flight back to the US, Cline sent the following cable (only partially shown) to Bundy to summarize his exit interview. In the cable, Cline said Chiang Kai-Shek had agreed to tentatively set the target date to the beginning of October.
Source： CIA
中華民國的準備動作激怒了中華人民共和國，而且反應十分激烈。解放軍在6月份調動大批軍隊集結到台灣海峽對岸的福建地區，此舉驚動了美國，下面這份給美國總統的情報要點就說明了情勢的嚴重性（左邊是邦迪的筆跡）。
Chiang Kai-Shek’s war preparation provoked the PRC, who responded with a large-scale military buildup in the region across the Taiwan Strait in June, which caused grave concern in Washington. The following text was taken from the President’s Intelligence Checklist on June 19, which bore the handwritten note by Bundy.
Source： CIA
儘管美國政府還沒有對蔣介石的計畫買單，中國的新華社直接把美國拖下水，聲稱「蔣幫」是受了「美帝」的支持和鼓勵：
Although the US Government did not endorse Chiang’s plan, PRC’s official press agency, New China News Agency (NCNA) categorically blamed “the US Imperialism” for supporting and encouraging Chiang’s regime:
Source： JFK Library
雖然情況看來危急，美國政府卻沒有亂了陣腳。甘迺迪總統6月20日在白宮召開會議討論台海情勢，國防部長麥納馬拉（Robert S. McNamara）主張再蒐集更多情報，以確定中國的真正意圖。中情局因此增派了一架U-2到台灣，桃園基地同時有三架U-2進駐！此外，美國空軍也調派兩架U-2到菲律賓，準備必要時由中情局的飛行員使用。
Instead of responding with a show of force, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, in a June 20 meeting presided over by JFK, proposed collecting more intelligence on China. CIA augmented the U-2 force in Taiwan with one additional U-2. At one point, there were three U-2 at Taoyuan AFB (normally two). Because all U-2 at Taoyuan were reserved for China missions, USAF sent two U-2 to the Philippines to used by CIA pilots.
Source： CIA
除了高空偵察，美軍也建議每日以RF-101偵察機對福建、廣東一帶持續監控解放軍的動向。這也可以解釋為什麼美國空軍會從日本三澤基地調派第45戰術偵察中隊的RF-101C到台灣來支援。
In addition to high-altitude reconnaissance by the U-2, the US military proposed using RF-101 for continuous low-altitude reconnaissance covering Fujian and Guangdong areas. This may explain why the USAF sent the RF-101C from the 45th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron from Misawa, Japan, to augment the RF-101A fleet in Taiwan.
Source： CIA
有關黑貓中隊與快刀計畫的其他內幕，請參閱【快刀計畫揭密】一書。